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 This thesis will address the changing relationship between securities underwriters and 
non-financial corporations in the formative period of 1880 to 1920, specifically in regards to the 
practice of investment bank partners being appointed to the boards of directors of NYSE-listed 
nonfinancial firms. This is the first quantitative analysis of the changing relationship between 
securities underwriters and nonfinancial corporations at the end of the 19th century, and uses a 
novel data set created from the digitization of several primary sources. The analysis contributes 
to the literature on the dynamics at play in the rise of financial capitalism and identifies some 
implications of financialized corporate governance in the context of considerable information 
asymmetries. 
 The results indicate that underwriter representation on the boards of non-financial 
corporations changed dramatically over the sample period. Whereas only 15.8% of all NYSE-
listed corporations had a partner of a top tier investment bank on their boards in 1880, fully 
44.8% had one in 1910. This pattern of change was particularly pronounced among railroads, 
whose underwriter representation grew from 21.2% in 1890 to 63.4% in 1910. Railroads were 
the largest securities issuers prior to the turn of the century, and had experienced considerable 
turmoil in the wake of the Panic of 1893. The railroad industry is therefore the primary interest 
of this research. A decomposition of the changes in underwriter representation among railroad 
firms reveals that they were primarily driven by existing firms adding underwriters to their 
boards, and by the large number of firms without underwriters in 1890 not surviving to the year 
1910. There is no proportional difference, however, in the survivorship rates of firms without 
underwriters compared to firms with underwriters. 
	 4	
 Although a number of works have speculated that the presence of underwriters on the 
boards of directors of railroad firms improved shareholder value by reducing information 
asymmetries, the findings of this research do not offer any conclusive support for these claims. 
In theory, underwriter involvement in management during this time period should have improved 
firms’ access to capital, facilitated more efficient industrial organization, or signaled financial 
stability to other potential shareholders. If this were the case we would expect to see more 
common underwriter representation among smaller firms with less access to capital, a correlation 
between experiencing receivership and subsequently adding an underwriter to the board, or an 
increased probability of survivorship among firms with underwriters.  Analyses of accounting 





1.1 Financial Capitalism 
While the period of 1880-1920 may seem far removed from the present, the question of 
how to optimally negotiate between the potential benefits and dangers of a powerful financial 
sector still remains a hotly debated topic in politics today. The cycle of regulation and 
deregulation over the last one hundred years has featured the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which repealed some of its provisions1, the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 which introduced more regulation2, and the Financial Choice Act, which is currently being 
discussed in Congress and would once again scale back financial regulations3. These reversals 
over time demonstrate there has been no consistent approach to this question.  
The 1880-1920 period marked the emergence and rapid development of financial 
capitalism in America. Historians have characterized this as a system in which corporate 
decision-making is impacted by financial markets not only as capital allocation mechanisms, but 
also as social-capital allocation mechanisms (De Long, 1991). It is surmised in the existing 
literature that beginning in the 1880s, the close relationships between financial institutions and 
railroad directorates that had already existed were finally formalized by representation on those 
directorates (Carosso, 1970). These new, institutionalized relationships would have had the 
potential to benefit firms, their shareholders, and their creditors by reducing information 
asymmetries, but could have also imposed costs related to conflicts of interest. What actually 																																																								1	McDonald O. 2016. The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act: Myth and Reality. Policy Analysis No. 804, Cato 
Institute. Accessed 18 Apr. 2018. 2	History.com Staff. 2018. Dodd-Frank Act. History.com. Accessed 18 Apr. 2018. 3	Rappeport A. 2017. Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking Rules Passes in House. New York Times. Accessed 
18 Apr. 2018. 
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happened, in regards to board interlocks during this time period and the firm characteristics 
associated with them, remains undocumented. The purpose of this research is to assemble the 
data necessary to describe what truly happened during this time, and to provide the beginnings of 
a quantitative understanding of these early board interlocks.  
In order to understand the significance of financial capitalism, it is important to 
contextualize its origins. The middle of the 19th century saw rapidly increasing population 
density in urban areas, particularly in New York City. Between 1840 and 1860, in which the total 
population increased by 85 percent, the population of New York City grew by 300 percent. 
Urbanization presented new challenges to the state and local governments, such as the necessity 
of street lighting, water supply, and other capital-intensive infrastructure projects, which were 
difficult to finance with tax revenue alone (Edwards, 1938). The issuing of state and municipal 
bonds provided the capital needed to proceed with these projects in a culture that had eschewed 
high taxes and strong government since the Revolutionary War (Hurst, 1970). From the issuance 
and trading of these securities, American financial capitalism was born. 
While financial capitalism at first only took hold in the northeast, with the southern states 
largely sticking to their agrarian slave economy, the Union’s victory in the Civil War also served 
as a victory for financial capitalism and strong securities markets. In the beginning, securities 
exchanges primarily existed to trade state and federal bonds, until railroad securities began to be 
listed. The early listing of railroad securities was in fact not spearheaded by securities 
underwriters, but by captains of industry such as Cornelius Vanderbilt and others, who did not 
have enough private wealth to sustain the corporate expansion they aspired to (Edwards, 1938). 
The rapidly expanding influence of the NYSE at this time is illustrated by the quintupling 
of the market price of an NYSE membership over the late 1870s and early 1880s. The expansion 
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in the railroad industry was one of the leading factors in this process, with the number of railroad 
stocks listed on the NYSE nearly doubling between 1866 and 1879 (O’Sullivan, 2016). The 
number of NYSE-listed firms from the railroad sector and the industrials and utilities sector are 
displayed in Figure 1. The figure shows massive growth in the number of railroad firms in the 
1880s and somewhat of a decline after the Panic of 1893, in which many railroads went bankrupt 
and had to be reorganized (Edwards, 1938). 
Railroad speculators dominated the early investors in these securities prior to the 1880s, 
and engaged in “railroad wars” to seize control of the massive cash flows coming out of the 
industry during this period. They even used their political influence to protect themselves from 
the suits of other investors initiated within the judiciary system, necessitating another non-
legislative method of aligning their incentives with those of the shareholders (Hilt, 2014). The 
last twenty years of the 19th century, on which this research is focused, also marked a shifting of 
power away from the speculative capitalists or “railroad barons” and toward financial capitalists 
who took an interest in creating rather than extracting value for their firms (Edwards, 1938). 
Understanding the determinants of participation on corporate boards by those banking capitalists, 
and whether or not that participation benefitted shareholders, is the primary interest of this 
research. 
1.2 The Problems with Corporate Governance 
Board interlocks are but one potential solution to the main problems with corporate 
governance that have been present in our economy since the introduction of the business 
corporation. The first of these, declared the Type I problem by Lamoreaux (2009), is defined by 
the interests of the managers conflicting with the interests of the shareholders. The Type II 
problem, which becomes most relevant when attempting to solve the Type I problem, is defined 
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by the interests of the state superseding the interests of the shareholders. In mid-nineteenth 
century America, the potential for strong government to become a corrupting force in business 
was even more threatening than a concentration of power among corporate insiders (Lamoreaux, 
2009). This mindset combined with the political influence of railroad barons therefore rendered 
legal solutions powerless against the Type I problem (Hilt, 2014). 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), the book by Adolf Berle, Jr. 
and Gardiner Means that initiated the study of corporate governance, it is asserted that managers 
who are incentivized to maximize private profit alone would benefit more from cheating their 
shareholders than they would by making profits for them. One such example of this was the 
scandal surrounding Crédit Mobilier of America, the construction company hired to build the 
Union Pacific Railroad. Some of the directors of the Union Pacific Railroad also sat on the board 
of Crédit Mobilier, and overpaid themselves to do the construction. While securing massive 
profits for themselves, these directors also secured massive profits for their Crédit Mobilier 
shareholders, many of whom were influential members of Congress (Lamoreaux, 2009). This 
illustrates the egregiousness of the Type I problem during this period, and the difficulty in 
creating legislative solutions to address it. 
How best to align the interests of managers and shareholders of firms is something that 
has yet to be determined. The modern attempt at solving these conflicts of interest is through 
financialization, compensating managers based on financial metrics such as stock price, profits, 
or return on equity. Stock prices, if they accurately reflect the current expectations of future cash 
flows and shareholders have access to all the same information as managers, could be a viable 
managerial compensation metric that would successfully align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. In the presence of asymmetric information, however, as was common during this 
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period, not even stock price-based compensation would alleviate this problem (Admati, 2017). 
This is both because markets were far less efficient then than they are today, and also because 
shareholders had more limited access to information about firm operations.  
In fact, information was so asymmetric at this time that committing outright fraud was 
not uncommon. Misrepresentation of accounting data or other operations intended to mislead 
customers or the government could at first benefit shareholders, but would eventually impose the 
costs of litigation, fines, or loss of business as a result of the controversy, all of which may leave 
shareholders worse off than before (Admati, 2017). Another example of these abuses along a 
slightly different vein than the Crédit Mobilier scandal involves the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa 
Fe railroad, whose 1891-1894 financial statements were audited when it later went into 
receivership. These statements, which listed positive surpluses each year, were later revealed to 
be covering up annual deficits over $1,250,000 (Edwards, 1938). According to our data this 
railroad did in fact have a top underwriter on its board during these years; however, since this is 
but one example of a board interlock coinciding with fraud, it is not clear how representative it 
is. 
These observations suggest that the asymmetric information climate of the time made 
corporate governance more susceptible to abuses of power by the managers, and that the 
managers’ incentives may not have necessarily been aligned with those of their shareholders. 
While issues of shareholder rights, corporate governance, and the influence of the financial 
sector in the late 19th century have all been addressed anecdotally in existing literature, a 
quantitative description of the changing influence of Wall Street on corporate governance during 





There are several potential benefits to a firm that could come from the presence of an 
underwriter on its board. Modern-day regulators have encouraged the appointment of financiers 
to boards under the assumption that they would be a source of more effective board oversight. In 
turn this could improve shareholder value through generating long-lasting increases in cash flows 
(Guner, Malmendier & Tate, 2008). The mechanism through which bankers are expected to 
improve corporations by sitting on their boards is, first and foremost, the reduction of 
information asymmetries that could enable embezzlement and fraud as described in Chapter 1. 
This improved transparency could increase shareholder value in many ways, but the three 
channels considered here are capital acquisition, industrial organization, and signaling stability. 
These potential benefits, however, are also accompanied by the risk of an additional conflict of 
interest. 
2.1 Capital Acquisition 
First, board representation may facilitate transparent communication from the company 
to the underwriter, enabling the company to acquire the capital it needs to take on new, value-
creating projects that benefit its shareholders (Guner et al., 2008; Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). 
While a similar level of information exchange could be accomplished through establishing a 
contract dictating more detailed reporting or communications, such a process would be 
expensive and difficult to enforce (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). This issue is relevant not only to 
the firm’s managers and shareholders, but to all members of society. Since the court systems and 
laws that mediate these kinds of agreements are funded by taxpayers, information asymmetries 
are costly to all players in the market (Admati, 2017). 
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The issue of acquiring capital was especially pertinent to railroad companies in the 1880s, 
which built more miles of track in that decade than in any other (Chandler, 1977).  In order to 
finance this rapid expansion of their networks, they formed tight relationships with the most 
powerful investment bankers of the time, who could connect them with European sources of 
capital (Chandler, 1977; Edwards, 1938). One other result of this relationship, however, was that 
the managers of the firm had to give up some of their decision-making power to the investment 
bankers involved (Chandler, 1977). Hypotheses about our data based on the potential 
implications of this channel will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.2 Industrial Organization 
 The benefits of information exchange go the other way as well. Banks that either lend to 
multiple companies in the same industry or are represented on those companies’ boards gather 
industry-specific insight that would benefit the firms in the industry. In fact, this is the primary 
channel today through which bankers contribute to firm management. Since banker-directors 
today often do not have strong lending relationships with the firms whose boards they serve on, 
it is surmised that their primary contribution is industry-specific expertise (Kroszner & Strahan, 
2001). Modern theories about the significance of board interlocks in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries follow this model, and assert that their primary function at that time 
was to facilitate collusion or contribute a fuller understanding of the industry to firm 
management strategy (Chandler, 1977; Frydman & Hilt, 2017). 
This is a particularly convincing theory for the 1890s following the mass bankruptcy of 
the railroad industry in 1893 (Chandler, 1977). While there has been no prior quantitative study 
of this time period, many anecdotal accounts tell similar versions of the following story. During 
this period several investment bankers and speculators bought up the foreclosed railroads. The 
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investment bankers of J.P. Morgan and Company, along with the descendants of the railroads’ 
founders such as the Vanderbilts, then reorganized the roads by appointing seasoned managers to 
the roads’ boards of directors, and facilitating collusion among them (Chandler, 1977; De Long, 
1991). These associations then brought an end to the construction of parallel tracks and 
competitive ratemaking that had driven them to bankruptcy in 1893. The speculators, on the 
other hand, did not involve themselves at all with the management of the railroads they 
purchased, and the firms suffered as a result (Chandler, 1977). Whether or not this story is 
consistent with our data from the time period is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5. 
2.3 Signaling Stability 
 Finally this reduction in information asymmetries extends beyond just communication 
between the bank and the firm, but to other potential investors and creditors as well. In the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries an underwriter’s reputation was what enabled him to 
successfully maintain clients and acquire new ones. Therefore an association with fraud or 
mismanagement would likely cause his clients to take their business to one of his more 
respectable competitors instead (Frydman & Hilt, 2017; De Long, 1991). In his analysis of the 
success of J.P. Morgan’s firms (1991), De Long states, “If reputations as honest brokers are 
sufficiently fragile, a firm with a large market share will find it most profitable in the long run to 
strive to be above suspicion in every short run” (209). Therefore throughout this time period, the 
risk of conflicts of interest may in fact have been mitigated by the relative importance of a good 
reputation, which was difficult to build up but very easy to lose. 
While recent cross-sectional studies, such as the research by Kroszner and Strahan 
(2001), have identified common characteristics of modern firms with interlocking boards, a 
similar quantitative exploration of these trends in underwriter representation in the late 19th 
	 13	
century is still lacking. The aforementioned study by De Long (1991) examined common 
characteristics of firms with J.P. Morgan & Co. partners on their boards around the year 1910. 
He found that having a J.P. Morgan & Co. partner on your directorate was correlated with high 
price/book values and high earnings/book values. While assertions of causality using cross-
sectional data are dubious due to issues of endogeneity, his findings do suggest that the presence 
of a Morgan partner on the board was associated with high shareholder value. This is consistent 
with the anecdotal literature that the well-established underwriters of that time were seen as 
signals of stability to potential investors and monitors of firm management, which were highly 
valued contributions in an environment of asymmetric information (De Long, 1991). Whether 
these findings are capturing an underwriter’s ability to improve shareholder value or to detect 
unobservable firm characteristics associated with future success, a correlation between high 
market value and underwriter representation would support the stability-signaling channel story. 
2.4 Conflicts of Interest 
 While conflicts of interest today are characterized by the difference in risk appetite 
between creditors and shareholders (see Guner et al., 2008 and Kroszner & Strahan, 2001), the 
conflicts of interest during this time period were far more significant. In 1912 the Pujo 
Committee formed by the House of Representatives sought out to investigate the “money trust,” 
the network of financiers who were thought to be the masterminds behind the economy. Louis 
Brandeis, a progressive attorney at this time, then published a series of essays on their findings 
entitled, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (Frydman & Hilt, 2017). In much 
the same way as the Union Pacific’s directors hiring their own construction company and 
overpaying themselves, Brandeis argued that firms with underwriters on their boards paid 
excessive fees to those underwriting firms for their services, since they were both the buyer and 
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the seller. He goes on to point out that a prominent underwriter such as J.P. Morgan or one of his 
partners, who sat on the boards of railroads, steel companies, locomotive companies, and electric 
companies simultaneously, could effectively create one vertically-integrated monopoly over all 
of those industries, which would advantage the underwriting firm at the expense of consumers 
(Brandeis, 1914). Therefore conflicts of interest during this time period posed far more of a 
threat to consumer welfare than modern ones do. 
2.5 A Modern Counterfactual: The Case of Germany 
Though the economies of the U.S. and Germany are often compared due to their similar 
levels of wealth and stability, they utilize very different systems of corporate financing and 
corporate governance, which result in a conflict of interest problem in one but not the other. This 
is exhibited in the far higher propensity of German firms to have a banker on their board of 
directors than is the case in the U.S. today. While they use somewhat dated numbers (1974 for 
German firms and 1992 for U.S. firms), Kroszner and Strahan (2001) estimated that 75% of large 
German firms in that year had a commercial banker on their board, compared to 31.6% of large 
American firms. German banks also have no restrictions on equity ownership, and as such often 
own large blocks of shares in the companies whose boards they monitor, which enable them to 
internalize the positive externalities associated with information-gathering (Kroszner & Strahan, 
2001; Gorton & Schmid, 2000). They even control voting power through the proxy votes of 
small shareholders, which has been shown in their country to improve firm performance rather 
than creating a conflict of interest (Gorton & Schmid, 2000). 
This is likely because German universal banks are long-term investors, who not only 
supply loans to the firm, but also participate actively in board oversight and the allocation of 
internal cash flows. In this way the prominent role of German financial institutions in firm 
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management in the present day resembles how corporate management would have evolved in the 
U.S., had the political backlash against board interlocks in 1912 not reversed this trend. The 
closeness of this relationship between the financial sector and the rest of their economy both 
improves the effectiveness of banks in performing monitoring roles and reduces the costs of 
doing so. The benefits of having this relationship with a bank also exceed those of a similar 
relationship with a nonbank blockholder. This may be a result of banks’ superior expertise in 
regards to prudent financing decisions or the negotiating power that comes from their ability to 
cut off external financing (Gorton & Schmid, 2000). 
One main reason American banker-directors are faced with more conflicts of interests 
than German ones is that bank-based economies have far lower levels of liquidity than stock-
market-based economies. This is related to the fact that blockholders become privy to insider 
information about the firm, and are repeatedly faced with the choice to continue as a firm 
monitor or to trade on the information they have received. In economies with a relatively illiquid 
stock market, such as Germany, trading would result in a large loss. This illiquidity therefore 
incentivizes a relationship of long-term investment and firm monitoring, rather than a series of 
takeovers, as is often the case in the U.S. (Gorton & Schmid, 2000). 
Another way in which they differ is in the power of German banks to influence firm 
management through proxy votes. Under this system, small shareholders keep their shares at 
their bank. If they do not leave any special instructions for voting, which they rarely do, the bank 
is entitled to vote these shares. The presence of large shareholders has also been empirically 
shown to improve shareholder value in U.S. firms, although this practice is less common due to 
legal restrictions. This could be related to the fact that in stock-market-based economies the 
small shareholders are not incentivized to monitor the operations of the board. Monitoring is 
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often costly, and generates a free-rider problem that disincentivizes the active participation of 
small investors (Gorton & Schmid, 2000). 
These two main differences between Germany and the U.S. can be summed up by the 
relative strength of creditor rights in Germany. Legal doctrine in the U.S., on the other hand, is 
primarily interested in the rights of the shareholder. It is intended to deter banks from interfering 
in a company on its way to bankruptcy, since the interests of creditors and shareholders diverge 
most severely in times of financial distress. At the same time, however, it also prevents banks 
from monitoring and advising the firm (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). 
These institutions explain to some degree why banker-directors in the U.S. primarily are 
found on the boards of companies that are least likely to experience a conflict of interest. These 
firms tend to be large and well established, with little need for short-term financing. These 
qualities about the firm also do not appear to change after appointing a banker-director to the 
board, which is consistent with the presumed lack of conflict of interest and the weakness of the 
bank’s influence in management. Another contributing factor to this lack conflict of interest is in 
the relative rarity of banker-directors in the U.S. being affiliated with the main lender to the firm. 
This again is very different from the practice in Germany, where the main lender bank is very 
closely tied to firm management (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). 
The evolution of these institutions is foundational to understanding the trajectory of our 
economy in terms of shareholder-creditor interactions and the legal protections of both parties. 
The formative period of 1880-1920 marked one step in the direction of a version of financial 
capitalism similar to Germany’s, before that trajectory was reversed by the political backlash 
exemplified in the hearings of the Pujo Committee. It is therefore worth considering this period 
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in terms of the reduction in asymmetric information facilitated by board interlocks between 




 The data set assembled for this paper consists of observations at the firm level, with 
entries for the number of board interlocks and total board members collected at five-year 
intervals for all NYSE-listed firms. Some firms also have financial metrics from 1890, which 
were used in the analysis described in Chapter 5. The full process of constructing this data set 
used several historical sources in multiple steps described below.  
3.1 Corporate Boards of Directors 
 The first step in assembling the list of corporate directors was to compile a list of NYSE-
listed firms based on those included in the Financial Affairs section of the New York Times. 
There was, to our knowledge, no comprehensive list of all NYSE-listed stocks from which to 
compile this list of firms, so this section of the New York Times was consulted instead. Due to the 
relative illiquidity of the markets at this time compared to the present day, many stocks listed on 
the NYSE could go months or weeks without trading at all. Since the Financial Affairs section 
only reflected the NYSE-listed stocks that happened to be traded that day or that week, a more 
comprehensive (although still not fully comprehensive) list was compiled based on three separate 
issues of the New York Times published in the month of January for each year in the sample. For 
the sake of continuity, if a firm was not listed in one of the three issues of the New York Times 
for that year but did appear as an NYSE-listed firm five years prior and post, and had an entry in 
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the Poor’s Manual of Railroads, it was assumed to be NYSE-listed that year as well and so was 
included in the list. 
 Directors lists were then acquired and digitized based on the firms in this list. The boards 
of directors of railroad companies were either obtained from the Poor’s Manual of Railroads or 
the Manual of Statistics for each year in the sample, or an adjacent year if the directory for that 
particular year was unavailable. These sources were handbooks for investors published annually 
throughout the period that provided a brief summary of the firm’s recent history, its financial 
statements, and a list of its directors. We believe the substitution of an adjacent year’s board of 
directors is unlikely to introduce substantial inaccuracies into the data, since boards of directors 
of firms tend to change slowly. 
 The boards of directors for firms in the industrials and utilities sectors, on the other hand, 
were largely unavailable for the 1880s. In 1880 and 1885 only the boards of three and four firms 
respectively were found in either the Poor’s Manual of Railroads or NYSE listing statements, so 
the industrials and utilities sectors are omitted for the 1880s (see Figure 1). Their board data is 
first included for 1890 and 1895 since they begin to appear in the Manual of Statistics in 
somewhat substantial numbers in those years. Beginning in 1900 both the number of firms and 
the openness of their reporting expands, making the data for this part of the period more reliable. 
 Prior to 1900, which Figure 1 also illustrates, the railroad firms on the NYSE vastly 
outnumbered industrials and utilities firms. The changes in corporate governance that occurred 
among the railroads during this period therefore stood to impact the majority of investors, since 
railroad securities would have dominated most investment portfolios at this time. The number of 




 Detailed bond underwriting data was largely unavailable prior to the 1910s. For that 
reason, it is difficult to discern with confidence which underwriting firms were most influential 
in the late nineteenth century. The list of top underwriters used in this analysis was based on the 
list compiled by Frydman and Hilt (2017), which ordered the most prominent underwriting firms 
by volume of outstanding securities in the year 1913. To identify the top 10 underwriting firms 
referred to in the following chapters, I identified the top 10 most influential underwriting firms 
from this list that existed in 1895, 9 of which existed prior to that year. While there is no way to 
know for sure if these underwriting firms were the most important ones of their time, 8 of these 
10 firms were mentioned explicitly in the research done by Carosso (1970). Though not fully 
conclusive, this suggests our methods were logically sound. To account for the possibility that 
underwriting firms slightly lower on the 1913 list may have been more prominent in the late-
nineteenth century but lost market share prior to 1913, a list of the top 25 underwriting 
partnerships was also identified. This list consisted of the 25 highest-ranked firms from the list 
that existed in 1895, 20 of which existed in 1890, 16 of which existed in 1885, and 14 of which 
existed in 1880. 
 In the case of commercial banks that were also prominent securities underwriters (most 
notably the First National Bank of New York and the National City Bank of New York), their 
lists of directors were taken from either the Bankers Almanac and Register (for the years 1880 
and 1885) or the Rand McNally Bankers Directory (for the years 1890 and 1895). These sources 
were published annually throughout the period and contained not only lists of the directors of 
commercial banks at the time, but also served as a reference for economists and financiers 
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regarding the finances of banks, clearinghouse transactions, and outstanding state and federal 
debt issues. 
The partners of all private securities underwriting partnerships were obtained from the 
NYSE directories published for each year in the dataset. These directories listed the partners of 
all firms with at least one partner who owned an NYSE membership in that year. In some cases a 
firm did not have an NYSE member on their board that particular year, so they were not listed in 
this directory. In those instances, the partners of the firm used for the next year in the sample (for 
example, 1900 for 1895) were substituted into the data set for that year. In the same way as 
before with substitutions in the list of railroad directors, we assert that the partners of these firms 
change quite slowly, and so would not expect these substitutions to substantially jeopardize the 
validity of our results. 
3.3 Board Interlock Identification 
In order to identify the occurrences of board interlocks, the list of corporate directors was 
merged with either the list of top 10 or top 25 underwriting firms’ partners on the basis of full 
name code (described in more detail below) and year. Matches identified in the merge were 
coded as board interlocks, and the dataset was collapsed down to the firm-year level based on the 
total number of directors and board interlocks. In order to track the board composition of firms 
over time, railroads were assigned identification numbers to link them across years despite small 
changes in the name of the firm over time. 
 The lists of directors of railroads and underwriting firms were unique at the person-firm-
year level. Full name codes were then assigned based on the person’s first initial, middle initial, 
full last name, and any suffix they had, such as “Jr.”. This was to address issues resulting from 
some first names being abbreviated in different ways, or only initials being reported, which 
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became more common in the later years of the sample period. The accuracy and consistency of 
these full name codes unfortunately faced a few challenges, which were dealt with as 
systematically as possible. 
 The first issue that may have compromised the data somewhat was the presence of 
misspellings occurring in the directory itself, such the appearance of someone’s last name as 
“Shultz” in one year but “Schultz” in all other years. In cases of this type, I compared similar-
sounding names within the board of directors for the same firm over multiple periods, attempted 
to discern if the differently-spelled name corresponded to the same individual, and adjusted the 
last name if the evidence proved convincing. These instances were simultaneously documented 
and are easily reversible. Another issue along the same lines is the occurrence of spelling errors 
introduced during the digitization process, such as a “c” being mistranscribed as an “e.” These 
cases were confirmed by closely examining the original document, and were similarly corrected 
and documented. 
 Another possible issue with correctly identifying board interlocks is the nuance of the 
suffix “Jr.”. In some cases, men who are named after their father and given the suffix “Jr.” 
choose to drop the suffix following their father’s death. If some of the men in our dataset chose 
to do this, it could lead to mismatches across lists if one directory continued to assign him a 
suffix but another directory did not. In an attempt to address this problem, I examined the lists of 
directors with the same name at the same firm across time. In the small number of cases where 
an individual appeared on the board first with a suffix of Jr. and then later with no suffix, he was 
assumed to be the same person and was assigned his suffix in the later period as well. These 
cases were similarly documented and are again easily reversible. There were several additional 
cases where an individual and his son of the same name both appeared on the board of the same 
	 22	
firm, and later only one of them appeared without a suffix. In these cases it was impossible to 
determine whether the father or son stayed, and so their full name codes were left unchanged. 
This could compromise the accuracy of board interlock identification to some extent; however, 
these cases were sufficiently rare that we suspect they would not substantially alter our results. 
 Finally since the full name codes included only the first and middle initial, there were 
cases where two men of different first or middle names, but the same initials, were assigned 
identical full name codes. In these cases their full name codes were altered to distinguish them 
from one another, and were documented accordingly. This occurred in a small number of cases, 
and very rarely involved an individual who represented a board interlock.  
3.4 Grouping of Railroad Firms 
 The railroads were grouped into geographic regions and cohorts based on the age of the 
firm, in order to analyze correlations between these firm characteristics and the presence of 
board interlocks. 
 Based on where the majority of a railroad’s lines operated, it was assigned to one of three 
geographic regions: West, Northeast, or Southeast. The West category encompasses all firms 
whose primary operations occurred west of Chicago; the Southeast region encompasses the firms 
that operate east of Chicago but only as far north as Virginia; the Northeast region encompasses 
the firms that operate east of Chicago but only as far south as Virginia. 
 The cohorts of railroad firms were assigned based on the year in which they first 
appeared in our data. The 1880 cohort includes firms present in the data in 1880 where our study 
begins; the 1885-1890 cohort includes firms present in 1885 or 1890 but not in 1880. Only these 
two cohorts of firms are used in the regressions in Chapter 5, although later railroad firms do 
appear in the sample and are addressed in a more qualitative way.  
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3.5 Accounting Data 
 The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 stipulated that all railroad companies publish their 
financial statements, making it possible to collect financial data from the firms’ balance sheets 
and income statements using the Poor’s Manual of Railroads. Therefore for the firms in 
existence in 1890, we collected their total assets, common stock, surplus, and long-term debt 
outstanding from the 1890 Poor’s Manual of Railroads and in some cases the Manual of 
Statistics from 1890. We also obtained the par value of their common stock either from their 
financial statements or from the Poor’s Hand-Book of Investment Securities, which was a 
supplement to its Manual of Railroads. 
 The stock prices for those firms were taken from the January 2nd, 1890 issue of the New 
York Times, and was the closing price for 1889 if available in that listing. Again because of the 
illiquidity of the market at this time, some of the firms in our list did not happen to be traded on 
these particular days, but were added instead because they appeared in our data before and after 
that year. For these firms the stock price was instead taken from the closest possible day in 
January. In the small number of cases where neither of these methods proved fruitful, the stock 
price used in the dataset was the average of the high and low prices for the month of January 
1890 as reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle from January to June of 1891. This 
was another resource for investors at the time, which listed some financial data and news 
regarding different types of investments, including but not limited to railroad stocks. 
The market value of equity was then calculated by multiplying the stock price by the 
number of shares outstanding, which was inferred by dividing the value of common stock 
reported on the balance sheet by the par value of the stock. In cases where the par value or 
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surplus was unavailable, the market value of equity field was left missing and so these firms 
were omitted from calculations involving that number. 
Some of the firms that did not survive from 1890 to 1910 did not appear in the Poor’s 
Manual of Railroads for 1891 or 1892, possibly due to financial trouble. For these firms their 
common stock, surplus, and long-term debt were taken from the Manual of Statistics, but total 
assets was often not listed. The total assets value was estimated as the sum of all equity and 
liabilities reported in the Manual, but these firms were simultaneously flagged for inaccuracies in 
their accounting. Firms for which the average of the high and low stock prices was substituted in 
for a closing price were also flagged, along with any firms whose financial statements were 
outdated by more than one year. This flag was included in the regressions in Chapter 5, but was 
only marginally significant in one estimation. Therefore it seems unlikely that these small 
problems in the data collection impacted our results in a substantive way. 
 
Chapter 4 
Hypotheses and Preliminary Investigations 
4.1 Hypotheses 
 The broadest explanations for changes in the proportion of firms with board interlocks 
over time can be divided into three groups: within-firm board changes, survivorship, and firm 
entry. These categories together encompass the many simultaneous developments occurring in 
our data set over this period which together account for the trends that will be identified in 
Section 4.2. First, the time trend could be driven by firms that exist throughout the entirety of the 
period either bringing in or jettisoning their underwriters. The capital acquisition and industrial 
organization channels described in Chapter 2 would fall under this category. Second, time trends 
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could be more related to the characteristics of the firms that survived compared to the firms that 
died off over the period. The stability-signaling channel described in Chapter 2 would fall under 
this category. Finally, changes over time could also be explained by the entry of new firms with 
different propensities to have underwriters on their boards, which could be consistent with any of 
these stories, depending on those firms’ characteristics.   
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the rapid expansion of railroad networks in the 1880s 
necessitated connections to European capital (Chandler, 1977; Edwards, 1938). Therefore if 
board interlocks positively impacted firm performance through the capital acquisition channel, it 
would be natural to expect an increase in underwriter representation on the boards of railroad 
companies during this decade. It would also be natural to expect smaller railroad firms to have a 
higher propensity to add an underwriter to their board throughout this period, since they might 
have been attempting to use that underwriter’s connections to expand. 
 Another potential channel discussed in Chapter 2 was the industrial organization channel, 
which would suggest that underwriter representation would increase for the boards of railroad 
firms following the Panic of 1893. This is based on the many anecdotal accounts that underwriter 
involvement in the corporate governance of these firms facilitated collusion and helped to end 
the ruinous competition that precipitated the panic (Chandler, 1977). The case in favor of this 
channel would be strengthened by underwriter representation on the boards of industrials and 
utilities firms remaining fairly constant following 1893, since the bankruptcies from this panic 
were limited to the railroad sector. 
 Finally, if it were true that board interlocks served as a signal of stability to other 
potential creditors and investors, as De Long asserted in his 1991 paper, it should be the case that 
the presence of an underwriter on a firm’s board was associated with larger and older firms, 
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those with higher market value, and those with lower leverage. These would be the firms most 
likely to survive the economic turmoil of 1893, and therefore be least likely to jeopardize the 
reputations of the underwriters who positioned themselves on their boards. It is worth noting that 
the predictions of the stability-signaling channel and the capital acquisition channel in terms of 
firm size are diametrically opposed to one another; stability-signaling would suggest a 
relationship between underwriters and large, well-established firms, while capital allocation 
would suggest a relationship between underwriters and small, up-and-coming firms. 
4.2 General Time Patterns in Board Interlocks with Underwriters 
 The first step in analyzing this new dataset was to plot the changing representation of 
underwriting firms on corporate boards over time. Figure 4.1 depicts the change over time in the 
share of railroads with an underwriter on their board, and compares the trajectories of 
representation of the top 10 underwriters and top 25 underwriters. Since the trends are largely 
consistent with each other in showing that the largest increase in underwriter representation 
occurred between 1890 and 1910, we feel confident in focusing in on those years more 
specifically for our analyses in Chapter 5. Furthermore it does not appear to be a concern that 
these trends are specific to only the top 10 underwriting firms, but rather that the behavior of the 
top 10 firms is indicative of an industry-wide trend. For that reason the analysis in Chapter 5 will 
also focus primarily on the relationship between railroads and the top 10 underwriting firms. 
It is worth understanding which railroad firms were the driving force behind the growing 
prevalence of this relationship. To that end, Figure 4.2 depicts a comparison over time of 
underwriter representation among firms from the 1880 cohort compared to the 1885-1890 cohort. 
From this preliminary investigation it appears as though the rising proportion of railroads in the 
1880 cohort with underwriters on their boards played a significant role in driving the trend, while 
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top 10 underwriter representation in the more recent cohort did not grow to the same extent. The 
dynamics of this change will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. It is worth noting in 
addition to this that underwriter representation among 1885-1890 cohort firms follows a different 
pattern when considering the top 25 underwriting firms rather than just the top 10. The plot can 
be found in the Appendix as Figure A4.2, and motivates the regressions in Chapter 5 that 
consider all top 25 underwriting firms. 
The increase in the prevalence of underwriter representation among railroads in the 1880 
cohort over this period is partially due to a reduction in the total number of railroad firms, 
reflected in the denominator, and partially due an increase in the number of firms with an 
underwriter on their board, reflected in the numerator. The paths of these trends with respect to 
the top 10 underwriting partners are shown in Figure 4.3. The respective contributions of both of 
these movements to the overall change in underwriter representation are again described in more 
quantitative detail in Chapter 5. 
It is also important to consider the widespread railroad bankruptcies of the 1880s and 
1890s, particularly those that occurred during the financial panic of 1893, and their role in 
spurring more underwriter representation specifically in the railroad industry. By comparing the 
trajectory of underwriter representation among railroad companies versus industrials and utilities 
companies, we can see that this practice grew in the railroad industry to a much larger extent, as 
shown in Figure 4.4. This is consistent with the industrial organization channel, which generated 
the hypothesis that underwriter representation would increase among railroad firms over these 
years but not among industrials and utilities firms. While this figure maps only the change over 
time in the representation of the top 10 underwriting firms, the trend in the representation of top 
25 underwriting firms (Appendix Figure A4.4) is similar. The extent to which board interlocks 
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expanded in the railroad sector clearly exceeds that of the industrials and utilities sectors, 
suggesting it may be related to the frequency of receiverships and foreclosure sales experienced 
by railroads throughout this period, which did not occur to a similar extent in the industrials and 
utilities sectors. This divergence of board interlock frequency is explored more fully in Chapter 
5. 
 Since the largest expansion in the prevalence of board interlocks between underwriters 
and railroads occurred between 1890 and 1910, as shown in Figure 4.1, Chapter 5 will focus 
primarily on the changes particular to this subset of the time period. More specifically the 
regressions in Chapter 5 will include only those railroad companies in existence in 1890, and in 
some estimations will be restricted further to the companies that survived until 1910. This subset 
consists of 48 firms, 36 of which did not have an underwriter on their board in 1890 and 12 of 
which did. The breakdown of this set of firms into their region categories is shown in Table 
4.1.1. The breakdown for the firms in the expanded list of all railroads in existence in 1890 is 
given in Table 4.1.2. 
 Of the firms in existence in both 1890 and 1910, 26 were members of the 1880 cohort 
and 21 were members of the 1885-1890 cohort. The breakdown of the firms in each cohort by 
the number with and without top 10 underwriters on their boards of directors is shown in Table 
4.2.1. The breakdown for the firms in the expanded list of all railroads in existence in 1890 is 
given in Table 4.2.2. 
 Financial metrics were also collected for this set of firms, and are compared in Table 4.3. 
The market value of equity, as described in Chapter 3, was calculated by multiplying the stock 
price by the number of shares outstanding. Total assets, debt, surplus, and common stock were 
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taken from the balance sheet. Leverage in this context was calculated by dividing the long-term 
debt outstanding by total assets. Tobin’s Q was calculated in the following way: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠)𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
Table 4.3 displays summarizing statistics for these financial metrics, which will be incorporated 
into the regressions in chapter 5. 
 Since some of the financial metrics of the railroads in the 1880 cohort look substantially 
different from those in the 1885-1890 cohort, Table A4.4 is included in the Appendix to compare 
these railroads’ financial metrics across cohorts. The statistical significance of the difference 
between each cohort’s long-term debt, along with the high statistical significance of the 
differences in market value, indicate that the firms from the 1880 cohort are larger than their 
newer peers. The marginal significance of the difference in surplus and the high statistical 
significance of the difference in Tobin’s Q also suggest older firms were perceived as more 
valuable by potential shareholders, and perhaps that they suffered less in the recession and stock 
market downturn that occurred in the late 1880s.  
 These significant differences between financial metrics across cohort suggest that these 
financial metrics may be collinear with cohort fixed effects when included in the same 
regressions. To that end, the estimations in Chapter 5 will be calculated both with and without 




Analysis and Results 
5.1 Decomposing Changes in Underwriter Representation 
A. Railroads, 1890-1910 
 In order to quantify the relative importance of the three categories of change discussed in 
Chapter 4 (within-firm board composition, survivorship, and new firm entry), we can decompose 
the overall change into its component parts. From there we can assess the capital acquisition, 
industrial organization, and stability-signaling channels in Section 5.2 with a more complete 
understanding of the relative importance of each in the overall time trends we observe.  
 The first step in isolating these three categories of change from one another is to 
decompose the change in the proportion of firms with a board interlock into its component parts: 
the change due to the rising number of board interlocks, reflected by the increase in the 
numerator, and the change due to the falling number of railroad firms on the NYSE, reflected by 
the decrease in the denominator. In 1890, 22 of the 104 NYSE-listed railroad firms in our sample 
had a top 10 underwriting partner on their board of directors. By 1910, this proportion grew to 45 
out of 71 firms with top 10 underwriter representation. Therefore we can decompose this 
aggregate change into the change in the number of interlocks and the change in the total number 
of railroads as follows: 
ΔUnderwriter Representation = ΔNInterlocks + ΔNFirms 4571− 22104 = 45104− 22104 + 4571− 45104  42.2% = 22.1%+ 20.1% 
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 The total change in underwriter representation in the industry over this period was 42.2 
percentage points, of which 22.1 percentage points are associated with the number of interlocks 
and 20.1 percentage points are associated with the total number of railroad firms. 
The 23 additional interlocks that appeared over this period were the result of 20 old firms 
that previously did not have an underwriter on their board acquiring one (NA), the appearance of 
13 new firms with underwriters on their boards (NN), and the disappearance of 10 old firms that 
previously had underwriters (NO). Therefore this 22.1 percentage point change can further be 
decomposed as follows: 
ΔNInterlocks =  NA + NN – NO 
 22.1% = !"!" (22.1%)+ !"!" (22.1%)− !"!" (22.1%) 22.1% = 19.2%+ 12.5%− 9.6% 
 Therefore the 22.1 percentage point increase related to the number of interlocks is the 
result of a 19.2 percentage point increase associated with old firms acquiring an underwriter, a 
12.5 percentage point increase associated with the entry of new firms with underwriters, and a 
9.6 percentage point decrease associated with old firms that had underwriters in 1890 exiting the 
market. Therefore the firms that added a board interlock between 1890 and 1910 played a 
substantial role in this change, although the exit of older firms that previously had underwriters 
had a strong effect in the opposite direction. 
 The net loss of 33 railroad firms over this period was the result of the disappearance of 56 
old firms (NExit) and the entry of 23 new firms (NEntry). Therefore this 20.1 percentage point 
change can further be decomposed as follows: 
ΔNFirms = NEntry - NExit 20.1% = !"!!! (20.1%)− !"!!! (20.1%) 
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20.1% = −14.0%+ 34.1% 
The 20.1 percentage point increase related to the net loss of firms is the result of a 34.1 
percentage point increase associated with the exit of old railroad firms and a 14.0 percentage 
point decrease associated with the entry of new railroad firms. 
This decomposition tells us that the most important factors of this overall time change 
were related to within-firm board composition changes and survivorship. Since once again these 
are both the most relevant categories in predicting this change, and encompass the capital 
acquisition, industrial organization, and stability-signaling channels, we will continue to pursue 
our investigations of these channels using regression analysis in Section 5.2. 
B. Industrials and Utilities, 1900-1910 
 I next apply this same decomposition technique to the change in underwriter 
representation among industrials and utilities, in order to determine whether the patterns 
observed above were unique to the railroad industry. The largest growth in underwriter 
representation among the firms in these sectors occurred between 1900, when 20 of the 109 firms 
had board interlocks, and 1910, when 42 of the 123 firms had board interlocks (see Figure 4.4). 
As before, we can decompose this aggregate change into the change in the number of interlocks 
and the change in the total number of industrials and utilities firms as follows: 
ΔUnderwriter Representation = ΔNInterlocks + ΔNFirms 42123− 20109 = 42109− 20109 + 42123− 42109  15.8% = 20.2%− 4.4% 
While the magnitude of the overall change is less than half what it was in the railroad 
industry, the change in the number of interlocks plays a disproportionate role in explaining this 
change. It is therefore necessary to further break down the change in the number of interlocks 
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into its four component parts. Here the 22 additional interlocks that appeared over this period 
were the result of 14 old firms that previously did not have an underwriter on their board 
acquiring them (NA), the appearance of 16 new firms with underwriters on their boards (NN), the 
disappearance of 6 old firms that previously had underwriters (NO), and the loss of underwriter 
representation on the board for 2 firms over this decade (NL). Therefore this 20.2 percentage 
point change can further be decomposed as follows: 
ΔNInterlocks =  NA + NN – NO – NL 
 20.2% = !"!! 20.2% + !"!! 20.2% − !!! 20.2% − !!! (20.2%) 20.2% = 12.8%+ 14.7%− 5.5%− 1.8% 
 This decomposition shows that similar to the railroad industry, the acquisition of 
underwriting partners over this period played a substantial role in this change over time, although 
for these industries the more significant component was the addition of new firms with 
underwriters on their boards. 
 The net gain of 14 industrials and utilities firms over this period was the result of the 
disappearance of 40 old firms (NExit) and the entry of 54 new firms (NEntry). Therefore this 4.4 
percentage point decrease can further be decomposed as follows: 
ΔNFirms = NEntry - NExit −4.4% = !"!" (−4.4%)− !"!" (−4.4%) −4.4% = −17.0%+ 12.6% 
This 4.4 percentage point decrease related to the net loss of firms is the result of a 12.6 
percentage point increase associated with the exit of old industrials and utilities firms and a 17.0 
percentage point decrease associated with the entry of new industrials and utilities firms. The 
entry of new firms between 1900 and 1910 therefore played a large role in the change in both the 
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number of interlocks and the total number of firms, although those two effects were opposite in 
sign. The overall change is accounted for in large part by the acquisition of underwriters by firms 
that existed throughout the whole period, which was one of the most important factors in the 
decompositions of these dynamics for the railroad industry as well. A more detailed analysis of 
these dynamics among industrials and utilities firms rather than railroads is left as a subject of 
future research. 
5.2 Determinants of Underwriter Acquisition over 1890-1910 
 The first set of regressions is intended to address the within-firm board composition 
category of change, which encompasses the capital acquisition and industrial organization 
channels as discussed in Chapter 2. These estimates were calculated by applying equation (A) to 
only those firms without underwriters in 1890, which were therefore candidates for acquiring an 
underwriter over the next 20 years, and survived to the year 1910. The right hand side includes a 
dummy variable for whether or not the firm went into receivership between 1890 and 1910, 
which anecdotal evidence suggests should be correlated with underwriter acquisition. This is 
because the powerful investment bankers at the time were thought to have been called in 
following bankruptcy to facilitate collusion between competing railroads and stabilize their 
operations. Other terms included in different iterations of the model include a vector of financial 
metrics such as the log of total assets, a measure of leverage, and Tobin’s Q, denoted by 𝑋! , a 
dummy variable indicating the accounting flag described in Section 3.5, cohort fixed effects 
denoted by 𝛾!, and region fixed effects denoted by 𝛿!.  𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 ! =  𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 ! + 𝛽!𝑋! + 𝛽! 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔 ! + 𝛾! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!   (A) 
 The results of the model are displayed in Table 5.2.1. These estimations include firms 
whose stock prices, par values, or other financial metrics were unavailable or outdated, but the 
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flag for these potential problems was incorporated into regression (5). For the estimates with 
those firms excluded see Table A5.2.1 in the Appendix. While the coefficients on receivership 
are not statistically significant except in regression (3), it is worth acknowledging that only 6 
firms in this subset went into receivership between 1890 and 1910, and 5 of those firms added 
underwriters to their boards during this period. In contrast, of the 30 firms in this subset that did 
not go into receivership only 15 of them acquired underwriters. Therefore the lack of statistically 
significant correlations demonstrated by these estimates should not dismiss receivership as a 
relevant factor in the firm’s decision to bring on an underwriter to their board of directors. These 
findings are not entirely inconsistent with the industrial organization story that has been well-
established in historical literature. Even in this small sample, however, the log of total assets is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that larger firms were the ones 
more likely to acquire an underwriter over this period. Since these large firms likely would not 
have needed the most help acquiring capital, these findings are inconsistent with the capital 
acquisition story. 
Based on the plot in Chapter 4 of the change in underwriter representation over time by 
cohort, one would expect a significant negative coefficient for the 1885-1890 cohort fixed effect. 
In regression (2), which does not include financial metrics,  the coefficient for the 1885-1890 
cohort is marginally significant and has the expected sign. In regression (4), when financial 
metrics are included, the coefficient drops in magnitude and loses its statitiscal significance, 
reflecting the collinearity between the cohort fixed effect and our vector of financial metrics. 
This suggests that the estimate in regression (2) was marginally significant because it was 
picking up differences in total assets, market value, and leverage that were highly correlated with 
the age of the firm. 
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 The estimates calculated from running specification (A) again, instead using the list of 
top 25 underwriting partners, are displayed in Table 5.2.2. These estimations again include firms 
whose stock prices, par values, or other financial metrics were unavailable or outdated, but again 
this flag is included. For the estimates with those firms excluded see Table A5.2.2 in the 
Appendix. Here 4 of the 5 firms that went through receivership added underwriters to their 
boards, compared to 16 of the 26 firms that did not. While these proportions differ less than 
those considering only the top 10 underwriting firms, they still appear to be quite different from 
each other. These estimations are therefore still not entirely inconsistent with the industrial 
organization story. 
In these estimations the financial metric with a statistically significant correlation to the 
addition of an underwriter is leverage rather than total assets, although when the accounting flag 
is included in the regression the coefficient on leverage decreases in magnitude and becomes 
only marginally significant. The loss of significance of total assets between regressions (3) and 
(4) may reflect the collinearity between a firm’s size and the cohort it belongs to. Leverage and 
the accounting flag indicator, on the other hand, are not strongly correlated (p=0.245). A 
convincing explanation for this finding is therefore still lacking, although the somewhat large 
number of statistical tests in this project leave room for the possibility that the significance of 
this particular term was due to random chance. What is most surprising about regression (4) is 
that the sign of the coefficient on leverage is negative, indicating that the firms with less debt in 
1890 were the ones most likely to acquire an underwriter over this period. This is potentially 
consistent with the capital acquisition story, since it may capture that firms with low debt levels 
wanted to expand by issuing more debt and needed an underwriter’s assistance in doing so. 
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 The fact that the firm characteristics surrounding the addition of a top 10 underwriter 
seems inconsistent with the capital acquisition story, while firm characteristics surrounding the 
addition of a top 25 underwriter do seem consistent with this story is somewhat confounding. 
One possible explanation is that newer firms sought out lower-tier underwriters to help them 
raise capital, perhaps since those firms were less powerful and imposed lower costs associated 
with conflicts of interest. Older, more well-established firms, on the other hand, may have 
benefitted more from the prestige associated with a top 10 underwriting partner on their board 
than from the access to finances. The lack of significance of receivership is complicated by the 
small number of firms in the sample that experienced receivership during this subset of the time 
period, and the true relevance of receivership to board composition may be underestimated in 
this model. It does not, however, provide any convincing evidence in favor of the industrial 
organization channel story. 
5.3 Determinants of Survivorship over 1890-1910 
 The second set of regressions was intended to address the survivorship category of 
change, which encompasses the stability-signaling channel discussed in Chapter 2. These 
estimates were calculated by applying equation (B) to all firms in existence in 1890. The right 
hand side includes a dummy variable for whether or not the firm had an underwriter in 1890, 
which again we would expect to be positively related to firm survival. Other terms included in 
different iterations of the model include the same vector of financial metrics as before, denoted 
by 𝑋! , the flag for potential accounting problems, cohort fixed effects denoted by 𝛾!, and region 
fixed effects denoted by 𝛿!.  [𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑]! =  𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 ! + 𝛽!𝑋! + 𝛽! 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔 ! + 𝛾! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!  (B) 
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 The results of the model are displayed in Table 5.3.1. These estimations again include 
firms whose stock prices, par values, or other financial metrics were unavailable or outdated, but 
this flag was again included in regression (5). For the estimates with those firms excluded see 
Table A5.3.1 in the Appendix. Contrary to anecdotal and theoretical arguments, having an 
underwriter in 1890 does not appear to be associated with a higher likelihood of survival to 1910. 
The estimates for the coefficient on this term are not statistically significant in any specification, 
despite this sample size being much larger than those used in Section 5.2. The coefficient on log 
of total assets, on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. It is 
worth noting that regressions (3) and (4) in Table A5.3.1 yield marginally significant and 
negative coefficients on leverage. This suggests that larger firms, and perhaps those with lower 
debt ratios, were more likely to survive this period, which is expected. 
 The estimates calculated from running specification (B) again, instead using the list of 
top 25 underwriting partners, are displayed in Table 5.3.2. These estimations again include firms 
whose stock prices, par values, or other financial metrics were unavailable or outdated, but this 
flag was again included in regression (5). For the estimates with those firms included see Figure 
A5.3.2 in the Appendix. The significance of the log of total assets and leverage terms is 
consistent with the estimates using only the list of top 10 underwriting firms (while the inclusion 
of the accounting flag in regression (5) pushes the p-value on leverage slightly above the 10% 
level, its magnitude hardly changes). This suggests that unlike the choice to hire an underwriter, 
the likelihood of the firm surviving does not appear to be related to how old the firm is or what 
tier their underwriter belongs to (if they have one at all). Instead, the firm’s survival appears to 
rely most substantially on solid financials, which is reasonable to expect. 
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 The lack of association between survivorship and underwriter representation in 1890 does 
not support the assertion that board interlocks were signals of effective management. If the 
stability-signaling channel held true, we would expect underwriting partners to be able to detect 
unobservable characteristics of a firm or its management style that would make it more 
successful, or would be able to strengthen the firm themselves. Since evidence of this channel’s 
effectiveness is lacking, it seems unlikely that underwriters truly had that much power or 
intuition regarding the fate of the firm. 
These results may at first seem contradictory to the decomposition in Section 5.1 that 
identified survivorship as a driving factor of the change in overall underwriter representation in 
the railroad industry. The findings of the decomposition calculations isolated a 34.1 percentage 
point increase in underwriter representation associated with the number of firms that exited the 
market between 1890 and 1910. While the overwhelming majority of firms that exited the 
market over this period did not have underwriters on their boards in 1890, firms with and without 
underwriters survived at approximately the same rates. The high number of deaths among firms 
without underwriters is simply due to the fact that substantially fewer firms in 1890 had board 
interlocks than did not. Therefore while it is true that most of the railroad firms that disappeared 
between 1890 and 1910 did not have underwriters on their boards, this is a reflection of the low 
rates of underwriter representation throughout the industry in 1890 rather than a differential 





 While there is no shortage of anecdotal and theoretical speculation in the literature 
regarding the relationship between underwriters and corporate boards of directors in the late 19th 
century, this thesis introduces a novel data set and quantitative approach to understanding this 
relationship. Its primary contribution therefore is descriptive in nature, rather than an assertion of 
causality. 
 A case could be made for the placement of securities underwriters on corporate boards of 
directors to follow either a pattern of positive selection or a pattern of negative selection. That is, 
it could be the case that underwriters were brought onto the boards of firms that were struggling 
financially in order to help them survive the economic turmoil, exhibiting negative selection. On 
the other hand, it could also be the case that underwriters only agreed to sit on the boards of 
firms they considered financially stable, exhibiting positive selection. Our results regarding the 
drivers of underwriter acquisition between 1890 and 1910 identify firms with large balance 
sheets and low levels of leverage as those most likely to acquire an underwriter over this period. 
This would be consistent with positive selection and would cast some doubt on the capital 
acquisition story, since it is doubtful these large and stable firms would have had difficulty 
accessing finances. The lack of a robust correlation between experiencing receivership and 
acquiring an underwriter is surprising, given that most anecdotal assessments of this time period 
assert that underwriters intervened to facilitate collusion among struggling railroads (Chandler, 
1977; De Long, 1991). It is also possible, however, that the estimates are simply not significant 
because of the very small number of railroads that experienced receivership and also survived to 
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1910, rather than being related to the intrinsic relevance of receivership to board interlocks. 
These findings therefore neither support nor refute the industrial organization story. 
 The survivorship regressions, which use the expanded sample of all firms in existence in 
1890, still do not show a statistically significant correlation between the presence of an 
underwriter in 1890 and the firm’s subsequent survival. These findings therefore also do not 
support the assertions that underwriter involvement in corporate governance necessarily 
improved a firm’s likelihood of surviving the Panic of 1893. Instead the variables that appear to 
be correlated with survival are again total assets and leverage, which we would expect to be good 
indicators of a firm’s financial stability. Therefore these results also do not support the argument 
that underwriter involvement in corporate boards improved shareholder value or was an effective 
signal of unobservable firm characteristics that would predict survival. 
 The results of this research do not support the existing anecdotal and theoretical 
arguments that underwriter involvement in the railroad industry facilitated collusion and allowed 
certain firms to survive the economic turmoil of the 1890s. While we would generally expect a 
board interlock between a major underwriting firm and a railroad company to reduce asymmetric 
information, which scholars generally believe would improve shareholder value (Guner et al., 
2008), it is either possible that both negative and positive selection occurred simultaneously and 
canceled each other out in our data, or that a board interlock is simply not the correct indicator of 
this relationship in 1890. One recommendation for further research would be to study how the 
railroads from the 1880 cohort developed between 1880 and 1890. Another would be to search 
for more exogenous sources of variation in the data, or to look more closely at the whole time 
series rather that isolated snapshots at years 1890 and 1910. A third would be to apply a similar 
quantitative approach to understanding the industrials and utilities firms’ relationships to the 
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financial sector, since they so quickly overtook the railroads in terms of securities issues after the 
turn of the century. Looking into any of these possible angles of analysis may yield better 
determinants of underwriter representation or more opportunities for causal inference than were 








This figure illustrates the number of firms in our data set by sector, which is not a fully comprehensive list 
of all NYSE-listed firms throughout the period due to data collection limitations described in Chapter 3.1, 
but represents the most frequently traded firms of the time. Prior to 1900, it was in many cases difficult or 
impossible to locate the list of directors for some industrials and utilities firms due to a lack of reporting 
requirements. These firms are reflected by the white bars in the plot. The data for 1900 and subsequent 
years were compiled by Frydman and Hilt (2017). This figure illustrates that late-nineteenth century 
securities markets were primarily dominated by railroad stocks, which motivates the focus of this research 
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The above figure plots the proportion of railroad firms with at least one partner of an 
underwriting firm, separated by tier. The list of top 10 underwriting firms consists of the 10 
underwriters from the list compiled by Frydman and Hilt (2017) that were in existence in 1895, 9 
of which were in existence before then. The list of top 25 underwriting firms consists of the 25 
underwriters from the same list that were in existence in 1895, 20 of which were in existence in 










This figure depicts a comparison between the change over time in underwriter 
representation on the boards of railroad companies originating prior to 1880 and those 
originating between 1881 and 1890. This plot is limited to interlocks with partners of the 








These plots depict the change over time in the number of NYSE railroad firms in our data set 
compared to the number of NYSE railroad firms with top 10 underwriters on their boards, 










This figure depicts the share of firms in the railroad sector with at least one partner of a top 
10 underwriting firm on their board of directors, compared to firms in the industrials and 
utilities sectors with top 10 underwriters on their boards. This plot is limited to the top 10 
underwriting firms because the aggregate trajectory of board interlocks based on the top 10 
























1880 82 57 25   12.4 
1885 98 83 15   11.5 
1890 136 104 32   11.0 
1895 118 83 35   11.5 
1900 186 77 109   14.7 
1905 157 62 95   18.6 
1910 194 71 123   21.2 
1915 217 70 147   22.1 
1920 379 76 303   20 
 
The firms in the pre-1900 samples were compiled based on those firms listed in the Financial 
Affairs section of the New York Times, as described in Section 3.1. The list of firms from 1900 
and on was taken from the data set assembled by Frydman and Hilt (2017). The average size of 
the board of directors is limited to the boards of railroad firms because the quantitative research 















Board Interlocks with Top 10 Underwriting Partnerships in 1890 by Region 
For Firms that Survived 1890-1910 
Region 
Number with a Top 10 
Underwriter in 1890 
Number without a Top 
10 Underwriter in 1890 
Total Number of 
Railroads 
West 4 18 22 
Southeast 0 3 3 
Northeast 8 15 23 
Total 12 36 48 
        
This table shows the number of railroad firms that were NYSE-listed both in 1890 and 1910, broken 
down by the region of the country where most of their lines operated, and by whether or not they had a 
Top 10 underwriter on their board of directors in 1890. The Western region includes all railroads west 
of Chicago, and the Northeast and Southeast regions divide the eastern part of the country at the state of 
Virginia. We limit this to interlocks with partners of the top 10 underwriting firms because the trajectory 
of board interlocks based on the top 10 firms looks quite similar to that of the top 25 firms, as shown 
















Board Interlocks with Top 10 Underwriting Partnerships in 1890 by Region 
For All Firms Existing in 1890 
Region 
Number with a Top 10 
Underwriter in 1890 
Number without a Top 
10 Underwriter in 1890 
Total Number of 
Railroads 
West 10 32 42 
Southeast 1 11 12 
Northeast 11 39 50 
Total 22 82 104 
        
This table shows the number of railroad firms that were NYSE-listed in 1890, broken down by the 
region of the country where most of their lines operated, and by whether or not they had a Top 10 
underwriter on their board of directors in 1890. The Western region includes all railroads west of 
Chicago, and the Northeast and Southeast regions divide the eastern part of the country at the state of 
Virginia. We limit this to interlocks with partners of the top 10 underwriting firms because the 
trajectory of board interlocks based on the top 10 firms looks quite similar to that of the top 25 firms, 














Board Interlocks with Top 10 Underwriting Partnerships in 1890 by Cohort 
For Firms that Survived 1890-1910 
  
Number with a Top 10 
Underwriter in 1890 
Number without a Top 
10 Underwriter in 1890 
Total Number of 
Railroads 
1880 Cohort 9 17 26 
1885-1890 Cohort 3 19 22 
Total 12 36 48 
        
This table shows the number of railroad firms that were NYSE-listed both in 1890 and 1910, broken down based on 
what year they first appeared on the NYSE, and by whether or not they had a Top 10 underwriter on their board of 
directors in 1890. The 1880 cohort includes firms that appear in our data set as early as 1880, and the 1885-1890 cohort 
includes firms that appeared in our data set for the first time in either 1885 or 1890. We limit this to interlocks with 
partners of the top 10 underwriting firms because the trajectory of board interlocks based on the top 10 firms looks 














Board Interlocks with Top 10 Underwriting Partnerships in 1890 by Cohort 
For All Firms Existing in 1890 
  
Number with a Top 10 
Underwriter in 1890 
Number without a Top 
10 Underwriter in 1890 
Total Number of 
Railroads 
1880 Cohort 12 32 44 
1885-1890 Cohort 10 50 60 
Total 22 82 104 
        
This table shows the number of railroad firms that were NYSE-listed in 1890, broken down based on what year they first 
appeared on the NYSE, and by whether or not they had a Top 10 underwriter on their board of directors in 1890. The 1880 
cohort includes firms that appear in our data set as early as 1880, and the 1885-1890 cohort includes firms that appeared in 
our data set for the first time in either 1885 or 1890. We limit this to interlocks with partners of the top 10 underwriting 
firms because the trajectory of board interlocks based on the top 10 firms looks quite similar to that of the top 25 firms, as 















1890 Financial Metrics of Railroad Firms 
  N 
Mean               
(in millions!) 
Standard 
Deviation           
(in millions!) 
Minimum                
(in millions!) 
Maximum                
(in millions!) 
Total Assets 104 $64.5 $74.2 $3.07 $416 
Long-Term Debt 104 $29.2 $36.4 $0.57 $232 
Mkt Value of Equity 95 $13.5 $18.5 $0.05 $95.7 
Common Stock 104 $22.9 $25.4 $0.04 $150 
Surplus 103 $1.86 $4.14 -$7.08 $25.9 
Tobin's Q 94 0.801 0.245 0.277 1.893 
Leverage 104 0.451 0.158 0.069 0.978 
            
This table shows summarizing statistics of the financial metrics from 1890 collected for all the railroad companies in 
existence at that time. Total assets, long-term debt, common stock, and surplus were taken from each firm's balance sheet. 
Market value of equity was calculated by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding. Tobin's Q was 
calculated by dividing the sum of total assets, surplus, and the difference between market value of equity and common stock 
by total assets. Leverage was calculated by dividing long-term debt by total assets. 








Determinants of Top 10 Underwriter Acquisition Between 1890 and 1910 
Acquired an Underwriter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Receivership 0.3333* 0.2216 0.2856** 0.1895 0.1807 
  (0.1826) (0.1792) (0.1374) (0.1334) (0.1446) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.2807*** 0.2349*** 0.2432*** 
      (0.0614) (0.0748) (0.0767) 
Tobin's Q     0.4026 -0.0495 -0.0559 
      (0.2541) (0.2461) (0.2595) 
Leverage     -0.5791 -0.8043 -0.6294 
      (0.6026) (0.5406) (0.5869) 
Southeast   -0.0867   0.0111 -0.0503 
    (0.3473)   (0.2218) (0.2308) 
West   -0.1598   -0.2637* -0.2909** 
    (0.1611)   (0.1410) (0.1417) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.4474**   -0.3258 -0.2948 
    (0.1195)   (0.2022) (0.2082) 
Accounting Flag         -0.1966 
          0.1215 
Constant 0.5*** 0.8286 -4.6338*** -3.0554* -3.2364* 
  (0.0939) (0.1195) (1.0743) (1.5436) (1.5842) 
Observations 36 36 35 35 35 
R^2 0.0625 0.3096 0.4146 0.5632 0.5822 
            
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes only 
firms with no top 10 underwriter on their boards in 1890, which were also still in existence in 1910. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a top 10 underwriter on its board by 






Determinants of Top 25 Underwriter Acquisition Between 1890 and 1910 
Acquired an Underwriter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Receivership 0.1846 0.1144 0.2111 0.1034 0.0934 
  (0.2096) (0.2145) (0.1713) (0.1464) (0.1782) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.1880** 0.1932 0.1987 
      (0.0904) (0.1307) (0.1310) 
Tobin's Q     0.4626* 0.1728 0.1467 
      (0.2564) (0.2578) (0.2431) 
Leverage     -0.8982 -0.9503*** -0.7065* 
      (0.5365) (0.3255) (0.3912) 
Southeast   -0.1710   -0.0394 -0.1302 
    (0.3532)   (0.2468) (0.2593) 
West   -0.2763   -0.3678 -0.3942* 
    (0.1971)   (0.2349) (0.2205) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.3671**   -0.1927 -0.1586 
    (0.1749)   (0.2245) (0.2254) 
Accounting Flag         -0.2905* 
          (0.1551) 
Constant 0.6154*** -.9218*** -2.7902 -2.3779 -2.5008 
  (0.0986) (0.0829) (1.6985) (2.5401) (2.5548) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 
R^2 0.0201 0.2782 0.2739 0.4507 0.5009 
            
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes only firms with 
no top 25 underwriter on their boards in 1890, which were also still in existence in 1910. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a top 25 underwriter on its board by 1910. The receivership variable 






Determinants of Survivorship Between 1890 and 1910 
Survived from 1890 to 1910 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Having a top 10 underwriter 0.1064 0.0539 0.0015 -0.0173 -0.0173 
  (0.1206) (0.1114) (0.0976) (0.0977) (0.0975) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.2356*** 0.2215*** 0.2215*** 
      (0.0315) (0.0345) (0.0348) 
Tobin's Q     -0.0034 -0.0864 -0.0861 
      (0.1766) (0.1883) (0.1930) 
Leverage     -0.5366* -0.4822 -0.4824 
      (0.2755) (0.2991) (0.3035) 
Southeast   -0.1340   -0.0762 -0.0760 
    (0.1395)   (0.1421) (0.1452) 
West   0.1225   0.0076 0.0077 
    (0.1052)   (0.1027) (0.1030) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.2113**   -0.0973 -0.0973 
    (0.1017)   (0.0997) (0.1002) 
Accounting Flag         0.0009 
          (0.1288) 
Constant 0.4390*** 0.5380*** -3.3809*** -3.0277*** -3.0277*** 
  (0.0553) (0.0958) (0.5556) (0.6310) (0.6344) 
Observations 104 104 94 94 94 
R^2 0.0076 0.0807 0.2937 0.3037 0.3037 
            
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes all firms in existence in 1890. 








Determinants of Survivorship Between 1890 and 1910 
Survived from 1890 to 1910 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Having a top 25 underwriter 0.1237 0.0672 0.0179 -0.0029 -0.0027 
  (0.1075) (0.1041) (0.0940) (0.0956) (0.0950) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.2353*** 0.2210*** 0.2210*** 
      (0.0316) -0.0346 (0.0349) 
Tobin's Q     -0.0030 -0.0835 -0.0830 
      (0.1778) (0.1885) (0.1930) 
Leverage     -0.5347** -0.4892* -0.4895 
      (0.5510) (0.2914) (0.2961) 
Southeast   -0.1272   -0.0738 -0.0733 
    (0.1408)   (0.1428) (0.1459) 
West   0.1196   0.0078 0.0079 
    (0.1053)   (0.1028) (0.1031) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.2098**   -0.0961 -0.0961 
    (0.1014)   (0.0994) (0.1000) 
 Accounting Flag         0.0018 
          (0.1281) 
Constant 0.4247*** 0.5289*** -3.3821*** -3.0215*** -3.0218*** 
  (0.0584) (0.0989) (0.5510) (0.6244) (0.6266) 
Observations 104 104 94 94 94 
R^2 0.0129 0.0824 0.2940 0.3035 0.3035 
            
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes all firms in existence in 1890. 
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This figure depicts a comparison between the change over time in underwriter representation on the 
boards of railroad companies originating prior to 1880 and those originating between 1881 and 














This figure depicts the share of firms in the railroad sector with at least one partner of a top 25 
underwriting firm on their board of directors, compared to firms in the industrials and utilities 











1890 Financial Metrics of Railroad Firms by Cohort 
  1880 Cohort 1885-1890 Cohort   
  
Mean                    
(in millions!) 
Mean                      
(in millions!) Difference 
Total Assets 
$116                    
($71.9) 
$79.9                    
($101) 
 $3.60              
[31.7]  
Long-Term Debt 
$53.3                 
($39.4) 
 $28.1                 
($28.4)  
 $25.2         
[12.3]**  
Mkt Value of Equity 
$31.6                
($22.2) 
 $10.7              
($16.1)  
 $20.9        
[6.94]***  
Common Stock 
$38.5                  
($22.3) 
 $30.2                 
($37.2)  
 $8.32         
[11.1]  
Surplus 
$5.79              
($6.79) 
 $1.94                
($3.99)  
 $3.85         
[1.99]*  
Tobin's Q 
0.963               
(0.291) 
0.728                
(0.144) 
0.235      
[0.082]*** 
Leverage 
0.426                  
(0.155) 
0.410                    
(0.116) 
0.016        
[0.049] 
        
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard deviations are in parentheses; standard errors 
are in brackets. This table shows a comparison between the means of all financial metrics used 
in the regressions in Chapter 4. The significance of these differences between the firms in each 
cohort suggests the possibility that cohort fixed effects may be collinear with these financial 
indicators. For that reason the fixed effects are omitted from some estimations. 









Determinants of Top 10 Underwriter Acquisition Between 1890 and 1910 
For Firms with No Accounting Oddities 
Acquired an Underwriter (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Receivership 0.24 0.2041 0.2346 0.189 
  (0.2118) (0.2198) (0.1500) (0.1528) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.2782*** 0.2425*** 
      (0.0708 (0.0812) 
Tobin's Q     0.2529 -0.0646 
      (0.2102) (0.2428) 
Leverage     -0.8677 -0.8848 
      (0.6255) (0.6405) 
Southeast   -0.1205   0.0191 
    (0.3515)   (0.2359) 
West   -0.1883   -0.2314 
    (0.1884)   (0.1615) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.3567*   -0.2562 
    (0.1840)   (0.2190) 
Constant 0.56*** 0.8380*** -4.3061*** -3.1612* 
  (0.1028) (0.1340) (1.2720) (1.6840) 
Observations 30 30 29 29 
R^2 0.0333 0.2207 0.4037 0.5137 
          
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes 
only firms with no top 10 underwriter on their boards in 1890, which were also still in existence in 
1910. This sample further excludes those firms whose stock prices were taken as an average of the 
monthly high and low rather than a closing price, or ones with missing or outdated values on their 
financial statements. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a top 
10 underwriter on its board by 1910. The receivership variable reflects whether the firm went into 








Determinants of Top 25 Underwriter Acquisition Between 1890 and 1910 
For Firms with No Accounting Oddities 
Acquired an Underwriter (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Receivership 0.0357 0.0491 0.0725 0.0206 
  (0.2480) (0.2876) (0.1969) (0.1978) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.1274 0.1441 
      (0.1088) (0.1424) 
Tobin's Q     0.1457 0.0279 
      (0.1814) (0.2705) 
Leverage     -1.4271*** -1.2346** 
      (0.4910) (0.4431) 
Southeast   -0.2209   -0.0117 
    (0.3565)   (0.2940) 
West   -0.3129   -0.2901 
    (0.2232)   (0.2547) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.2209   -0.1190 
    (0.1885)   (0.2330) 
Constant 0.7143*** 0.9448*** -1.1382 -1.2546 
  (0.1028) (0.0800) (2.0437) (2.8161) 
Observations 25 25 25 25 
R^2 0.0009 0.1893 0.2785 0.3897 
          
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes only 
firms with no top 25 underwriter on their boards in 1890, which were also still in existence in 1910. This 
sample also excludes those firms whose stock prices were taken as an average of the monthly high and 
low rather than a closing price, or ones with missing or outdated values on their financial statements. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a top 25 underwriter on its board 









Determinants of Survivorship Between 1890 and 1910 
For Firms with No Accounting Oddities 
Survived from 1890 to 1910 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Having a top 10 underwriter 0.0648 0.0114 -0.017 -0.0356 
  (0.1318) (0.1217) (0.1123) (0.1130) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.2289*** 0.2097*** 
      (0.0348) (0.0380) 
Tobin's Q     -0.0363 -0.1107 
      (0.1855) (0.2049) 
Leverage     -0.6678** -0.6118* 
      (0.3170) (0.3492) 
Southeast   -0.1395   -0.0461 
    (0.1488)   (0.1488) 
West   0.1638   0.0615 
    (0.1196)   (0.1137) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.2030*   -0.1094 
    (0.1132)   (0.1125) 
Constant 0.4615*** 0.5408*** -3.1761*** -2.7584*** 
  (0.0626) (0.1061) (0.6141) (0.6917) 
Observations 84 84 79 79 
R^2 0.0029 0.0908 0.2988 0.3126 
          
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes all 
firms in existence in 1890, excluding those firms whose stock prices were taken as an average of the 
monthly high and low rather than a closing price, or ones with missing or outdated values on their financial 








Determinants of Survivorship Between 1890 and 1910 
For Firms with No Accounting Oddities 
Survived from 1890 to 1910 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Having a top 25 underwriter 0.0893 0.0264 -0.0011 -0.0254 
  (0.1167) (0.1139) (0.1033) (0.1056) 
ln(Total Assets)     0.2280*** 0.2082*** 
      (0.0350) (0.0384) 
Tobin's Q     -0.0346 -0.1085 
      (0.1860) (0.2043) 
Leverage     -0.6752** -0.6291* 
      (0.3014) (0.3314) 
Southeast   -0.1346   -0.0453 
    (0.1511)   (0.1495) 
West   0.1622   0.0633 
    (0.1201)   (0.1144) 
1885-1890 Cohort   -0.2023*   -0.1096 
    (0.1130)   (0.1123) 
Constant 0.4464*** 0.5341*** -3.1617*** -2.727*** 
  (0.0672) (0.1105) (0.6048) (0.6857) 
Observations 84 84 79 79 
R^2 0.0071 0.0913 0.2986 0.3123 
          
* p < .10, ** p < .05,*** p< .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. This regression includes all firms 
in existence in 1890, excluding those firms whose stock prices were taken as an average of the monthly high 
and low rather than a closing price, or ones with missing or outdated values on their financial statements. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was still NYSE-listed in 1910. 
 
